Health professionals are well versed in the need to have systems in place which avoid mishaps happening to patients due to human error or breakdown in communications: for example, legal actions for damages for operations wrongfully performed on patients due to a failure in the identifi cation process; surgery involving the wrong limb or organ; medications being given to the wrong patient. Hospitals set in place systems by which a patient's name and procedures to be performed are checked multiple times throughout the patient's stay. This process is particularly vital when a patient is undergoing a surgical procedure which will be performed under anaesthesia. Nevertheless, systems failures continue to occur resulting in claims for damages by affected patients.
Introduction
Healthcare institutions are well aware of the need to put in place systems regarding the provision of healthcare services for patients in order to avoid unavoidable mishaps. These mishaps can involve a range of different factual circumstances. They can become the subject of a civil action by an affected patient. A case which was heard in the ACT Supreme Court in 2008, G and M v Armellin [2008] ACTSC 68, involved the transfer of two embryos during an in vitro fertilisation (IVF) procedure which resulted in the birth of two children when the plaintiff and her partner expressed the desire to have only one child. The trial judge found that the defendant doctor was not negligent due to the specific circumstances surrounding the transfer procedure, including the operation of the system at the Fertility Centre. The plaintiffs' appeal to the ACT Court of Appeal was allowed, the Court finding that the defendant doctor was negligent in transferring two embryos during the transfer procedure when the first plaintiff told him that she did not want a multiple pregnancy just prior to the transfer; 
The facts as per the Supreme Court decision: 24 July 2008
The first plaintiff, Ms G, gave birth to non-identical twin girls on 20 July 2004 following a successful IVF procedure on 12 November 2003. Both Ms G and her partner Ms M claimed that they only wanted one child and that Dr Armellin was negligent in transferring two embryos instead of one into Ms G's uterus during the IVF procedure. The plaintiffs sought damages from Dr Armellin for the cost of raising the second child, general damages for Ms G relating to the extra pain and difficulty caused by the pregnancy and childbirth and for the effect on the relationship between the two plaintiffs, together with a claim for economic loss for both as a result of the birth of the second child [1] .
The plaintiffs first consulted Dr Armellin on 17 December 2002 with a view to having a child by artificial insemination (AI) or by in vitro fertilisation (IVF) each of which incur a risk of multiple pregnancy [4] . The parties agreed that at this first consultation that Dr Armellin advised them of a 5% risk of multiple pregnancy with AI due to hyperstimulation when more than one follicle could be stimulated [6] . The plaintiffs accepted that there was a risk of multiple pregnancy in maximising the likelihood of a successful procedure and chose to continue with AI and subsequently IVF [7] .
The first course of treatment involving donor sperm was arranged through the Canberra Fertility Centre. Following a counselling session as required by the Fertility Centre, the plaintiffs were offered choices of donor sperm from which they made a selection [5] . Ms G received a course of hormone stimulating drugs to stimulate follicle production. Ultrasounds revealed four suitable follicles which could be exposed to donor sperm in utero. The plaintiffs considered that the risk of multiple pregnancy with four follicles was unacceptable. They notified the Fertility Centre to cancel the procedure on that occasion. The Centre notified Dr Armellin [8] .
Following adjustments to Ms G's hormone therapy, two follicles were produced and she agreed to continue the procedure on the basis that the risk of a twin pregnancy and birth was acceptable. However the Report insemination was unsuccessful in fertilising an egg [9] . Second and third attempts at AI were also unsuccessful. Following a consultation with Dr Armellin on 11 August 2003, the plaintiffs were enrolled in the IVF program which was commenced following surgery for the removal of endometriosis [10] .
Ms G claimed that she told Dr Armellin at both the above consultations that she did not want a multiple pregnancy and only wanted one child. Dr Armellin disputed the plaintiffs' evidence that they told him they only wanted one child. His recall was that the plaintiffs told him they wanted a child and it was his understanding that the risk of multiple pregnancy was acceptable to them. Bennett J accepted that Ms G told Dr Armellin that she did not want a multiple pregnancy [11] .
The parties agreed that at the 11 August consultation Dr Armellin advised the plaintiffs of the risks of hyperstimulation and multiple pregnancy with IVF treatment and the percentage risk of such with the transfer of two embryos. He advised that the percentage risk of multiple pregnancy with the transfer of one embryo constituted a lower risk of multiple pregnancy than that associated with the transfer of two embryos. Dr Armellin also advised that there was a 70% failure rate for IVF and that the chances of a successful outcome were increased when more than one embryo was transferred. The chances of a successful outcome were diminished unless more than one embryo was transferred. Ms G was unsure as to the number of embryos to be transferred and told Dr Armellin she would let him and the Fertility Centre know prior to the transfer [12] . While there was some dispute as to whether the conversation re the number of desired children took place, Ms G did not make a decision about the number of embryos to be transferred at the 11 August consultation and did not inform the specialist of such a number [13] .
On 11 September the plaintiffs attended the Fertility Centre at John James Memorial Hospital where Ms G completed and signed a request form for IVF or gamete intrafallopian transfer [14] . It was agreed by the parties that on this date the plaintiffs were advised by a nurse from the Fertility Centre to insert 'up to two' embryos to be transferred and to let the Fertility Centre 'know any time up to the procedure'. It was also agreed that the nurse told the plaintiffs that they 'could always make a decision later up to and including the morning of the procedure'. In evidence, Ms G said that she understood the nurse to say that she could inform the Fertility Centre 'any time up to the procedure'. Alternatively, she understood that she could inform Dr Armellin and the Fertility Centre 'before the embryo transfer' and that she could tell Dr Armellin or 'whoever was the key person at the time of transfer'. The second plaintiff, Ms M, understood that the nurse advised that they could 'make a decision later, up to and including the morning of the operation' which she later agreed meant that they could change the number 'up to and including the day of the procedure' [15] .
Although the plaintiffs expressed a concern regarding multiple pregnancy they signed the form which signified that, inter alia, there was a risk of multiple pregnancy. Following the nurse's advice, they endorsed the description of the procedure as being 'Ultrasound egg pickup. Fertilisation of oocyte using selected donor sperm. Embryo transfer of one to two embryos. Embryo transfer to be performed in theatre under anaesthetic. Freeze and store any remaining suitable embryos ' [16] .
Prior to the procedure being performed, Ms G was given a higher dose of hormones to obtain more than one egg for harvesting and fertilised with donor sperm. From these embryos the required number would be implanted [18] . On 10 November 2003, six eggs were harvested of which five were successfully fertilised. One of these five 'resolved', leaving four healthy embryos available for implantation [19] . Ms G had a conversation with staff at the Fertility Centre on 11 November 2003 during which she was told that five of the six eggs had been fertilised. There was also a discussion as to when Ms G was to attend the Fertility Centre for the embryo transfer the next day and the need to fast. Ms G stated she did not tell the person she spoke to at the Fertility Centre the number of embryos to be transferred [20] .
Ms G was admitted to Hospital on 12 November 2003. In the process of being admitted, signing documents and preparation for theatre, Ms G saw a number of nurses but did not tell any of them that she wanted only one embryo transferred, or to change the number of embryos for transfer as indicated on the form. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs were not asked by either Dr Armellin or the Fertility Centre staff regarding the number of embryos to be transferred nor did the plaintiffs tell them how many. Ms G stated that she did not make the decision to have only one embryo transferred until she was in the theatre [23] .
While in theatre, there was a conversation between Ms G and Dr Armellin re the number of embryos available for transfer. Dr Armellin told her that there were four good embryos and asked, 'are we going to implant two?' Ms G held up one finger and said 'no only one'. Dr Armellin advised her that one embryo could still result in two children to which Ms G responded 'Don't even joke ' [25] . Dr Armellin made a notation in an operation record prior to the procedure; 'embryo transfer one embryo under sedation'. Although he now acknowledges that two embryos were transferred, he believed, at the time, that one embryo was to be delivered by the embryologist [27] .
The procedure was performed in the theatre because Ms G wanted to be under sedation. The procedure normally involves Dr Armellin inserting a placement catheter and ensuring that it is in the correct position. He then contacts the embryologist to bring the embryos in a straw and to insert the embryos. This is done quickly as the embryos may warm up which can result in a decrease the pregnancy rate. While it is the embryologist who brings the embryos in the straw and inserts them in the Report catheter, Dr Armellin accepts responsibility for the actual transfer procedure [31] .
When the embryologist arrived in the theatre, Ms G was already under sedation. The embryologist recorded in the clinical notes that she put back 'the standard number of embryos which is two'. There was no discussion between Dr Armellin and the embryologist, as Ms G was under sedation [28] . It is clear that the embryologist and the Fertility Centre staff were unaware that Ms G wanted only one embryo transferred. Dr Armellin's evidence was that he understood that the number of embryos to be transferred had already been organised with the Fertility Centre [29] .
When Ms G was under sedation Dr Armellin inserted a catheter ready to take the straw containing the embryos which were then inserted by the embryologist as is usual practice. Dr Armellin did not ask the embryologist re the number of embryos included in the straw or prepared for transfer. This process took place approximately 60 seconds after the insertion of the catheter. Dr Armellin then said to the embryologist, 'just put the embryos back. I understand she only wanted one embryo', to which the embryologist replied, 'no there were two. She signed for two'. Dr Armellin uttered a swear word as it was only minutes after his conversation with Ms G [32] .
After the procedure the plaintiffs were advised by a staff member that two embryos had been transferred. Ms G had a blood test which confirmed that she was pregnant. A scan at seven weeks confirmed that Ms G was pregnant with twins. The plaintiffs saw Dr Armellin for a final consultation early December 2003 [36] .
The Law
Bennett J went on to discuss the applicable law when a plaintiff brings an action of negligence with respect to harm they claim resulted from the defendant's failure to avoid that harm. She referred to the need for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant owed her a duty of care, that he breached that duty of care and the damage claimed was caused by that breach. In any action for negligence, damage is the gist of the action. [36] . As this was a civil case, the plaintiffs had the burden of proving their case on the balance of probabilities and not at the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
The duty owed by Dr Armellin is governed by the common law and the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). Bennett J considered that there was no doubt that Dr Armellin owed Ms G a duty of care to both plaintiffs as he had a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in the provision of professional advice and treatment. Dr Armellin in evidence accepted 'that his duty encompassed providing advice to the plaintiffs as to the type of fertility treatment available, advising them as to the risks associated with infertility treatment, advising them of the availability of infertility treatment and "providing that treatment" once the plaintiffs decided to undergo '. This included the provision of treatment in the context of his role in the system [37] .
The standard the defendant is required to exercise is in accordance with the standards of a reasonable doctor in his position, that is, that of an ordinary skilled doctor having a special skill in the practice of infertility treatment [38] . The test to be applied to determine whether there has been a breach of the duty of care is whether a reasonable doctor in the defendant's position would have foreseen that his conduct posed a risk of injury to either or both of the plaintiffs. The duty is to reasonably foresee that his action or inaction may be likely to cause damage to the plaintiffs. If the answer is yes to this question, the court must ascertain what a reasonable man would do in face of the foreseeable risk [39] .
Following an extensive discussion of the facts, including the system in place at the Fertility Centre covering infertility procedures, and Dr Armellin's role in that system, Bennett J came to the conclusion that Dr Armellin did not breach his duty of care to the plaintiffs. She held he would have foreseen the risk of multiple pregnancy if two embryos were transferred but that he was unaware that two had been transferred until after the event. Although he was aware that Ms G only wanted one embryo transferred prior to the transfer, he was not aware that her decision had not been transferred to the Fertility Clinic staff who would have informed the embryologist. According to the Judge; 'That lack of knowledge on his part was reasonable in the context of the system in place at the Fertility Centre and the fact that Ms G had not complied with her expected participation in that system, a fact not transmitted to Dr Armellin' [87] . Ms G had signed a form authorising the transfer of one to two embryos. The transfer of two embryos was normal procedure for IVF to maximise implantation and pregnancy as against the risk of multiple pregnancy.
Although she had been told of the number of embryos and their condition the day before the procedure, Ms G did not tell the Fertility Clinic staff that she had changed her mind about the number of embryos to be transferred or that she only wanted one embryo transferred [88] . It was not until Ms G was in the theatre that she made up her mind about the number at which time she informed Dr Armellin. According to Bennett J. there was nothing to alert Dr Armellin that Ms G was conveying new instructions inconsistent with and altering the consent previously given [89] . Dr Armellin believed that Ms G's decision to have only one embryo transferred had been communicated to the embryologist through the Fertility Clinic [90] . Dr Armellin's reliance on the system was held to be reasonable. A reasonable doctor in his position would not have foreseen that the system had not operated in Report accordance with normal practice. Dr Armellin did not foresee that his conduct involved a risk of injury to the plaintiffs and this was reasonable in the circumstances [91] . Therefore, Dr Armellin was not negligent in failing to take the precaution of reducing the number of embryos to one [92] .
In the remainder of her judgment, Bennett J dealt extensively with issues of law raised by the case, which would have been relevant had she found that Dr Armellin was negligent. Such issues involved whether the plaintiffs' conduct amounted to contributory negligence on their part and the identification of the nature of any harm caused by the negligence. Also discussed was whether there was any failure to mitigate any damage claimed by the plaintiffs in their failure to abort the second foetus or to give the child up for adoption upon birth. According to Bennett J:
Although I have proceeded to consider the remaining matters to be proved in a negligence claim, as outlined above I have determined that Dr Armellin was not negligent by reason of the specific circumstances surrounding the transfer procedure including the operation of the system at the Fertility Centre. Accordingly, the application must be dismissed. [275] The ACT Court of Appeal decision 1
May 2009
After considering Bennett J's decision in the case at first instance, the Judges of the Court of Appeal were of the opinion that Ms G was given the impression that she could choose the number of embryos to be transferred at any time up until the procedure was performed. Dr Armellin relied upon the system in place at the centre for the provision of IVF. Under that system, the Fertility Centre staff had the responsibility to obtain the patient's decision re the number of embryos to be transferred. This is done by the form signed by the patient and usually required the staff to talk with the patient the day before the procedure regarding the number of viable embryos and the number to be transferred. The Centre confirms the number and tells the embryologist. The Centre has the responsibility to ensure the embryologist provides and delivers the number of embryos nominated and confirmed by the patient [31] .
The Court accepted that Ms G had not made a final decision the day prior to the procedure being performed. The opportunity for a last minute check was made more difficult in that the procedure was performed while Ms G was under sedation. It was usual practice for Dr Armellin, the embryologist and the patient to meet and make this check just prior to the implantation. According to Their Honours; 'The fact that this was more difficult with G sedated should have alerted Dr Armellin to the need to ensure that he checked with the appellants and the embryologist before the sedation occurred about the number to be transferred or at least checked that the Centre and the appellants knew precisely the actual numbers to be transferred ' [27] . 
The High Court decision 9 December 2009
Dr Armellin sought leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia against the determination of the Court of Appeal of the ACT which had allowed the plaintiffs appeal against Bennett J's decision against them in their negligence action against Dr Armellin in the Supreme Court of the ACT. According to the High Court; 'The Court of Appeal differed from the trial judge on one point. It said that he was negligent in permitting more than one embryo to be transferred, contrary to the wishes of the female plaintiff, and in not checking the facts with the embryologist involved and ensuring that the plaintiff's wishes in that regard were complied with ' [3] .
Heydon and Bell JJ unanimously agreed that the contest was a factual one and that there was no question of law identified in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal decision meriting a grant of special leave [4] .
Conclusion
Given that Dr Armellin was not granted leave to appeal to the High Court, the decision of the Court of Appeal finding him negligent in the transfer of the two embryos stands and the plaintiffs became entitled to be compensated for any damage they could prove to have resulted from the birth of the two children.
In the case Armellin case discussed in this report, there was a system in place, however, Dr Armellin failed to consider that the circumstances under which he was treating Ms G were out of the ordinary, therefore, he Report needed to exercise greater vigilance to ensure that his patient's wishes were adhered to. The transfer of embryos under sedation is not a usual practice. Ms G advised Dr Armellin that wanted only one embryo to be transferred just before she was put under sedation. The Court of Appeal held that Dr Armellin and the Fertility Clinic staff had left Ms G with the impression that she could make a decision as to the number of embryos to be transferred right up until the time the procedure was to be carried out. The embryologist remained in a room adjacent to the theatre until called into theatre by Dr Armellin to transfer the embryos at which time Ms G was already under sedation. As such, the usual practice of a joint discussion between the doctor, the embryologist and the patient in theatre just prior to the transfer to ensure the correct number of embryos were transferred could not take place. This unusual set of circumstances should have put Dr Armellin on notice that he should be extra vigilant to ensure the correct outcome. He could not just assume that the patient had notified the Fertility Staff of her wishes the day before which was usual practice.
So what can the providers of healthcare advice and services learn from this case? The case reinforces the need for all healthcare providers to be vigilant and ensure that they have systems in place whenever there is a foreseeable risk to patients irrespective of the factual circumstances. They also need to ensure that there is a system in place which ensures that each process is regularly revised. Education of new staff and re-education of existing staff is necessary to ensure that the systems are adhered to. It is very easy for administration and staff to fall into complacency merely because the systems are in place and perhaps nothing untoward has occurred over a period of time. It is too late to prevent an unavoidable accident once the factual circumstances giving rise to that incident have occurred.
An overreliance upon existing systems can also lead to unwanted outcomes as was the case in Armellin. When there is a deviation from usual practise as was the case in Armellin, a red flag should be raised to see whether that deviation requires extra caution before proceeding along a particular pathway. Health professionals learn from their mistakes but greater vigilance to see that systems are in place and regularly revised, together with regular education of new and existing staff on the need for caution should deviations from usual practice arise, should help to minimise the chances of them occurring.
A further point to note is that none of the judges considered that the consent form signed by the plaintiff was the final determination of the plaintiff. Patients who provide written consents are free to vary or revoke those written consents prior to the procedures being carried out. Although the consent forms represent agreements between the patient and the doctor who is to perform the procedure, they cannot be regarded as binding contracts. Lidcombe NSW 1825 AUSTRALIA Tel: 0408-265-254 email: mairjl@optusnet.com.au 
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